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Abstract 
Russia’s application for accession to the WTO is currently in its final 
phases and may be completed by the end of 2003.  In this context, this 
paper provides some background information on Russia’s recent policy 
and structural reforms, the composition and geographic distribution of 
trade, tariff rates by commodity groups, and other aspects of trade and 
domestic policies at issue in the accession process.  The accession proce-
dure and the current status of the accession process are then discussed.  
Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling analysis of 
China’s WTO accession as a prototype, the potential use of CGE model-
ing of Russian accession is considered as well as Russia’s participation 
in the Doha Development Round and preferential trading arrangements.  
It is concluded that Russia may realize significant benefits from WTO 
accession and from the multilateral trade liberalization to be effected in 
the Doha Round. 
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Robert M. Stern 




  The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic perspective on the issues 
involved in Russia’s accession to the WTO.  It was hoped initially to model the economic 
effects of Russian accession, but this has not been possible due to data and time con-
straints.  The discussion and analysis will therefore be mainly qualitative, although refer-
ence will be made to some existing quantitative studies of some aspects of Russian acces-
sion and the implications of Russian participation in post-accession WTO multilateral 
trade negotiations and preferential trading arrangements. 
  In Section II, I first discuss Russia’s achievements of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion and structural reform in recent years and then present some aggregate data on the 
composition and geographic breakdown of Russia’s merchandise exports and imports for 
the year 2000, aggregated tariff data for major import-commodity groups, and a discus-
sion of other aspects of Russia’s trade and related domestic policies.  In Section III, I dis-
cuss the procedural aspects of Russian accession, the current status of the accession proc-
ess, and the potential economic effects of accession.  In Section IV, I consider the 
implications of Russia’s post-WTO-accession participation in the ongoing Doha multilat-
eral negotiating round and in Section V implications for preferential trading arrange-
ments.  Conclusions  are presented in Section VI. 
                                                 
*
 I am indebted to Alan Deardorff for helpful comments on an earlier version of the pa-
per.   2
II.  Background Information 
  Before discussing the details and issues involved in Russia’s accession to the 
WTO, it is useful to provide some background information on Russia’s macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural reforms, the commodity and geographic composition of Rus-
sia’s foreign trade, tariffs and nontariff barriers, and some other salient aspects of Rus-
sia’s trade and related domestic policies. 
Russia’s Macroeconomic Stabilization and Structural Reforms 
  As noted in OECD (2002, pp. 9 seq.), output, employment, consumption, and 
investment increased significantly in 2000-01 following the financial crisis in August 
1998.  The Russian Government has been especially successful in promoting macroeco-
nomic stability.  Fiscal and monetary policies have been tightened, with the result of gen-
erating budget surpluses, stabilizing the exchange rate, reducing inflation, and improving 
Russia’s foreign credit rating.  A number of key institutional and policy reforms have 
also been introduced at the federal and state levels.  The recovery from the 1998 crisis 
was aided by a four-fold depreciation of the ruble in 1998-99 and by increased prices of 
oil and other Russian commodity exports on world markets.  While many structural re-
forms have been introduced, a number of institutional weaknesses nonetheless remain.  
These include:  recurring, large net capital outflows; relatively low domestic investment; 
persistence of household poverty in many areas; and continuance of heavily subsidized 
and regulated key public services. 
It is especially noteworthy that the Russian programs for economic policy and 
structural reform have been designed in large measure to encourage private sector activ-
ity.  At the same time, many of the policies adopted have been intended to underpin Rus-
sia’s efforts to achieve membership in the WTO.  What should be emphasized therefore 
is that the remarkable progress that Russia has made in promoting macroeconomic and 
financial stability and the redesign and redirection of policies and institutions will help to   3
ease the process of WTO accession and mitigate the potential dislocations that may occur 
as the Russian economy becomes more integrated into the global trading system. 
The Commodity and Geographic Composition of Russian Trade 
  As noted in table 1, Russia’s merchandise exports, exclusive of barter and “shut-
tle” trade, totaled $71.4 billion in 2000.
1  Minerals and fuels were 51.1 percent of total 
exports, industrial products, 46.9 percent, and agricultural exports, 2.0 percent.  The 
European Union/EFTA accounted for 45.1 percent of Russia’s minerals and fuels exports 
and 29.0 percent of industrial products.  The Former Soviet Bloc nations/republics com-
bined—the Baltic States, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS)--accounted for 26.5 percent of Russia’s minerals and fuels exports 
and 20.5 percent of industrial exports. 
  According to table 2, Russia’s merchandise imports, exclusive of barter and 
“shuttle” trade, were $28.5 billion in 2000.  Imports of agricultural products were 25.9 
percent of total imports, minerals and fuels, 5.5 percent, and industrial products, 68.5 
percent.  The EU/EFTA accounted for 29.1 percent of Russian imports of agricultural 
products and 43.6 percent of industrial products.  The Former Soviet Bloc members ac-
counted for 27.3 percent of Russia’s agricultural imports and 29.0 percent of industrial 
product imports. 
  Russia’s comparative advantage thus appears in broad terms to be in minerals 
and fuels and, to a lesser extent, in some categories of industrial products, while its com-
parative disadvantage is in other categories of industrial products and, to a lesser extent, 
                                                 
1
 According to the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, April 2002, 
Russia’s total exports were reported to be $105.5 billion in 2000, and total imports, $44.7 billion.  
“ Shuttle” trade refers to individuals or groups who travel abroad frequently and purchase items 
like clothing and used cars and bring them back to Russia for resale in special market places.  This 
trade is imperfectly covered in Russia’s trade statistics.  I am indebted to Ksenia Yudaeva for this 
information.   4
in agricultural products.  Its exports and imports are concentrated geographically with the 
EU/EFTA and with the former Soviet Republics and members of the Soviet Bloc.  This 
indicates the significance of geographic and political proximity in determining Russia’s 
external trade.
2  This is especially the case, given Russia’s export specialization in miner-
als and fuels, which are of key economic and strategic importance in its intra-European 
trade. 
  According to IMF, International Financial Statistics (April 2002), Russia was a 
net importer of cross-border services in 2000, with services debits of $17.4 billion and 
services credits of $9.6 billion.  The balance on goods, services, and income was $46.2 
billion.  The capital account for 2000 indicated inward foreign direct investment of $2.7 
billion, portfolio inflows of $12.8 billion, bank foreign borrowings of $12.1 billion, an 
increase in reserve assets of $15.5 billion, and net errors and omissions of $9.3 billion. 
Tariffs and Nontariff Barriers 
Official Russian trade-weighted tariffs for 1994 are reported by major commod-
ity groups together with the share of each group in total imports in Brenton, Tourdyeva, 
and Whalley (1997, p. 213).  As they note: “The trade-weighted average tariff was 
around 10 percent.  Tariffs tend to be low for vegetable products, mineral products, 
chemicals, and precision instruments.  These products comprised over 30 percent of Rus-
sian imports in 1994…  The average tariff is highest for textiles where it exceeds 20 per-
cent.  Textiles comprised about 3.5 percent of Russian imports in 1994.”  Official tariffs 
were increased somewhat in 1995 and 1996.  Estimates of official tariffs on an u n-
weighted basis by selected commodity groups are given in table 3.  As Michalopoulos 
                                                 
2
 It would be interesting to consider how likely it may be that the composition and geographic dis-
tribution of Russia’s trade will change as it becomes more fully integrated into the global trading 
system.   5
and Tarr (1997, p. 2) note, “… the average tariff is about 13-14% with a range from 0 to 
30% for most commodities, with some selected items considerably higher….” 
A major revision of official tariff rates was introduced in January 2001.  As 
Stamps (2001, p. 14) notes: 
“…tariffs were consolidated with 4 major product groups—raw materi-
als, semi-finished goods, food products, and finished products—with tar-
iffs ranging from 5 -20 percent ad valorem (the maximum rate was r e-
duced from 30 percent) for almost all tariff categories.  This represents 
an overall lowering of tariff rates from 11.4 to 10.7 percent. …However, 
unification caused tariff rates for some individual items to 
rise,…including higher rates for raw sugar (30 percent), poultry (20 per-
cent) and automobiles (25 percent).” 
  The official tariff rates noted above are substantially in excess of the “applied” 
rates, as can be seen in table 4.  According to the USTR (2002a, p. 365), the tariff 
unification introduced in 2001 was designed to help in dealing with customs fraud and to 
improve customs collection.  The tariff unification may also serve to limit the granting of 
tariff exemptions on imported inputs that give some firms a relative price advantage over 
other firms that rely more on domestically produced inputs.
3
  Nonetheless, the 
administrative weaknesses in implementing customs law pose genuine problems because 
of the lack of uniformity and transparency and may therefore constitute a significant 
barrier to imports.  The problems are likely to continue, as Stamps (2001, p. 11) notes, 
unless something can be done to limit the broad discretion that local Russian customs 
authorities have in interpreting customs laws. 
  In addition to tariffs, Stamps (2001, p. 12) notes that import licenses are required 
for a number of goods, including: ethyl alcohol and vodka; color TVs; sugar; precious 
metals, alloys, and stones; encryption software and related equipment; weapons; and ex-
plosives.  There are also strict licensing laws and import quotas on most distilled spirits.  
                                                 
3
 See Tarr (1999) for an analysis of Russia’s tariffs and recommendations for a strategy 
for implementing a low and uniform tariff regime.   6
Some of Russia’s import restrictions may be designed to increase government budget 
revenues.
4
  Russia also maintains limited access to its market for civil aircraft, and there 
are local content requirements for investments in the automobile industry. 
Other Trade and Related Policies 
  In addition to tariffs and nontariff barriers, there are several other trade-related 
policies that will figure prominently in the negotiation of Russia’s accession to the WTO.  
Brief summaries of the various policies are noted below, based upon the material reported 
in Stamps (2001) and USTR (2002a,b). 
•  Agriculture—Russia is currently undertaking agricultural reform, but it is not yet 
clear how this reform will affect the Russian agricultural sector.  Russia uses subsi-
dies to provide domestic support for farmers and is considering export subsidies as 
well.  But the WTO Agricultural Agreement provides a framework for the reduction 
of these subsidies.  The issue then will be to negotiate the amounts and duration of 
the agricultural subsidies. 
 
•  Intellectual property—Russia is presently party to major international agreements 
for the protection of intellectual property (IP) and is engaged in developing legisla-
tion to conform to the obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  However, there is concern that the enforcement of 
the IP laws is problematic because of limitations in the Russian judicial system and 
inadequate enforcement of penalties for IP violations, especially in software, films, 
videos, sound recordings, books, counterfeit branded consumer goods, and pharma-
ceuticals. 
 
•  Services—Russia is reportedly reluctant to liberalize its services sectors even though 
it may be in its own interest to do so.
5
  The problems of liberalizing non-financial 
services may be due to local regulations and the abuse of power and practices of the 
agencies and domestic firms involved.  There are stringent limits on the establish-
ment of foreign bank subsidiaries and companies selling insurance as well as restric-
tions on foreign investment in telecommunications, public services, marine transpor-
tation, transport services, and retailing.  The legal status of many aspects of electronic 
commerce is in a state of flux, and there are unresolved tax issues as well. 
 
                                                 
4
 According to USTR (2002a), revenue from tariffs and other import restrictions ac-
counted for 5.5 percent of total government budget revenue in 2001. 
5
 See Smith (1999) for an analysis of the role of services in the Russian economy and the 
requirements, negotiating dynamics and strategies, political and economic sensitivities, 
and sector-specific issues involved in the adherence of Russia to the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS).   7
•  Standards and certification—Russian standards and procedures for import 
certification are reportedly expensive, time consuming, and fraught with 
redundancies.  While some progress has been made in bringing Russian standards 
into conformity with the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 
there are continuing difficulties experienced in such sectors as construction materials 
and  equipment, consumer electronics, telecommunications equipment, oil and gas 
equipment, and veterinary and phytosanitary certification. 
 
•  Investment—Even with a new 1999 law governing foreign investment, Russia’s for-
eign investment regime is apparently viewed as confusing and contradictory.
6
  In-
vestment restrictions are applied in such sectors as aerospace, natural gas, electric 
power, and alcoholic beverages.  Investment may also be inhibited in many sectors 
by extant crime and corruption, problems in customs administration, inadequate legal 
protections and corporate governance, tax disincentives, local content requirements, 
and controls on capital flows.   
 
•  Government procurement—It appears that domestic suppliers are not granted many 
official advantages or privileges in competing for government procurement.  There is 
nevertheless a perception that there is a strong political bias for government support 
favoring domestic suppliers, the purchasing of Russian produced communication 
equipment being an example. 
 
•  State trading—Russia abandoned the earlier USSR state monopoly on foreign trade 
when it assumed an independent existence.  However, there are still some state-
owned or state-controlled enterprises that exercise monopoly control over such ex-
port commodities as natural gas, diamonds, and pipelines, and other companies that 
engage in barter trade or are granted special privileges by the state.  Drebentsov and 
Michalopoulous (1999, p. 59) estimate that 11-20 percent of Russia’s trade was con-
trolled by the state in 1997.  It will be necessary accordingly for Russia to clarify the 
status and privileges of state enterprises to conform with WTO rules (Article XVII of 
the GATT) governing state trading.  A closely related issue is the treatment of Russia 
by some WTO members as a “non-market” economy in the context of antidumping 
cases initiated against imports from Russia.  The third-country price comparisons 
used in these cases may make it difficult for Russia to defend itself.  If  Russia is des-
ignated as a “market” economy, Russian firms will then be able to use their own cost 




•  Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR)—Under the Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment in Title IV of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. President can deny “normal 
trade relations” (NTR) status for any non-market economy that denies or seriously 
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 See Bergsman, Broadman, and Drebentsov (1999) for an analysis and recommendations 
for improving Russia’s foreign direct investment policy regime. 
7
 As noted in European Union (2002), the EU formally recognized Russia as a “market” 
economy, according to a press release on May 29, 2002.  Similarly, as of June 6, 2002, 
according to a New York Times report by Tavernise, the United States will now regard 
Russia as a market economy.  It may turn out, however, that Russian subsidies on such 
public services as gas and electricity will be challenged in antidumping or countervailing 
duty actions.   8
restricts or burdens the rights of its citizens to emigrate.  The Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment can be waived in cases in which an affected country complies with the legisla-
tion’s requirements.  USTR Robert Zoellick (2002, p. 5) states that Russia has been 
in full compliance with the Jackson-Vanik amendment since 1994. But it will be up 
to the U.S. Congress to decide whether or not to grant Russia PNTR in the course of 
Russian accession to the WTO.
8
  Zoellick urges that PNTR should not be used as a 
U.S. negotiating ploy and that Russian accession should be based on its offers of 
market access in the accession process.
9
 
III.  WTO Accession 
  In this section, I first note and present in Appendix 1 below the main procedural 
aspects of accession to the WTO.  This is followed by a discussion of the ongoing status 
of Russian accession and the main issues that Russia and members of the WTO Working 
Party on accession seek to address.  Finally, I discuss the steps and measures needed to 
assess the economic effects of accession, using a recent evaluation of China’s WTO ac-
cession as a prototype. 
The Procedure for WTO Accession 
  The various steps in the procedure for WTO accession are available on the WTO 
website (www.wto.org) and are indicated in Appendix 1 below: 
The Current Status of Russian Accession 
  Stamps (2001a, pp. 8-9) provides a useful summary of Russia’s accession proc-
ess: 
  “Russia requested membership in the WTO in June 1993 (then 
known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT), and a 
WTO Working Party was formed that same month.  Initially comprising 
54 members, the current 25 members of Russia’s WTO Working Party 
include the United States, the European Union (EU), Argentina, Austra-
                                                 
8
 For the statements and testimony in a “Hearing to Explore Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations with Russia,” held before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means, April 11, 2002, see U.S. Congress (2002). 
9
 The issue of granting PNTR to China was somewhat contentious on human rights and 
related grounds, but was nonetheless approved by the U.S. Congress in connection with 
China’s accession to the WTO.   9
lia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Geor-
gia, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, 
Panama, Poland, New Zealand, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Turkey.  Rus-
sia’s application was formally transferred to the WTO after it was estab-
lished in 1995. 
  Russia submitted to the WTO Working Party its Memorandum 
of Foreign Trade Regime in March 1994.  That memorandum, which de-
tails Russian trade policies currently in place that have a bearing on the 
WTO Agreements, forms the basis of detailed fact finding by the Work-
ing Party.  Areas addressed in the memorandum include Russian import 
and export regulations, agricultural and industrial policies, policies af-
fecting trade in services, and policies regarding such areas as intellectual 
property rights, customs valuation, and licensing requirements.  A round 
of questions from WTO Working Party members about Russia’s memo-
randum, followed by Russia’s responses was completed in June 1995.  
The WTO Working Party then held its first meeting to consider Russia’s 
application in July 1995.  From late 1995 through the end of 1998 there 
were an additional 7 formal meetings of the Working Party to investigate 
the Russian trade, investment, and subsidies regimes. 
  Russia submitted its first market-access offer to the WTO Work-
ing Party for trade in goods in February 1998, providing a schedule of 
commitments on tariffs….  Russia tabled additional market-access offers 
for trade in agricultural products, including commitments on export sub-
sidies and domestic supports for farmers, and commitments for the pro-
tection of intellectual property rights, in December 1998.  Russia com-
pleted its WTO offer with the submission of a market-access offer for 
trade in services, including banking and financial services, telecommuni-
cations, and tourism in October 1999.  Commitments each member 
makes in its WTO accession negotiations become obligatory and en-
forceable under WTO rules. 
  With schedules of commitments on market access for trade in 
goods and for trade in services formally tabled, Russia’s initial market-
access offer was substantially complete and its WTO application ready to 
move from the information gathering phase to the negotiation phase.  
However, the WTO Working Party generally considered these initial of-
fers as deficient and far from a meaningful basis from which to begin ne-
gotiations.  In joining the WTO, countries commit to reduce and lock in, 
or “bind,” their tariffs….  Russia’s initial tariff offer, however, excluded 
500 of Russia’s 10,000 tariff lines from tariff binding commitments—
meaning that Russia could increase tariffs on those items without restric-
tion.  Moreover, Russia proposed to bind its tariffs at significantly higher 
rates than tariffs currently in force—a starting offer most WTO Working 
Party members found unacceptable.  Russia’s initial agricultural com-
mitments contained provisions for subsidies unacceptable to many WTO 
Work Party members….  Working Party members also expressed con-
cerns about the protection of intellectual property in Russia and enforce-
ment of penalties for violations of patents, copyrights, and trademarks.  
Russia’s initial services offer listed extensive cross-sectoral exceptions 
(“horizontal reservations”), contained an extensive list of countries ex-
empt from the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle of nondiscrimina-  10 
tion, and listed few or no commitments on business activities in many ar-
eas such as establishment of branches and representative offices. 
  Following bilateral and multilateral consultations with WTO 
Working Party members, Russia submitted a revised offer for trade in 
goods in March 2000.  In bilateral negotiations, the United States pre-
sented Russia with a detailed request for market access in services in 
May 2000.  Russia tabled further revisions for trade in goods and ser-
vices in February 2001.  The revised offers contained many market-
access improvements, although WTO Working Party members noted 
backward movement in some areas.  Russia’s revised tariff offer was 
broadened to apply to all 10,000 tariff lines, and the proposed bound tar-
iff rates were lower than those initially offered; however, the proposed 
revised bound tariff rates remained generally higher than currently ap-
plied rates in many cases.  The revised services offer eliminated many of 
Russia’s proposed cross-sectoral restrictions.  The revised agriculture 
market-access offer provided further details on Russia’s proposed regime 
for domestic agricultural subsidies.” 
 
  Working Party deliberations continued throughout 2001 and into 2002, 
culminating in the completion and circulation of the first draft of the Working 
Party Report in the spring of 2002.  Mike Moore (2002), Director General of the 
WTO, took note of this: 
“…nine years after applying to join the GATT and [after]seven years of 
its WTO Working Party, Russia’s accession is finally entering a decisive 
and final phase.  This is vividly demonstrated by the circulation of the 
first draft of the Working Party Report.  …the final version of that 
document, together with a Protocol of Accession and the Schedules of 
concessions in goods and services, will set the terms and conditions of 
entry of Russia into the WTO. 
 
…Reaching this stage has required an intense process of legislative re-
newal and reform by the Russian authorities.  …It is clear that a new le-
gal framework is now taking shape in Russia which will underpin Rus-
sia’s accession commitments.  Let me underline from the outset that this 
development has been made possible because of the strong political re-
solve shown by the Russian authorities at the highest level.  Without this 
resolve, the accession of Russia to the WTO would still be very far 
away.” 
 
Moore sums up: 
 
“No matter how difficult the outstanding problems may be, I b elieve 
there are in Washington, Brussels, and Moscow, people with the horse-
power, firepower and willpower to make this accession happen.  Acces-
sions, in their final phase, always come back to such core issues as agri-
culture, banking, insurance or telecommunications.  I can only hope that 
negotiators think in historic terms, because it will be a great failure of   11 
leadership if this accession is not completed in time for the Mexico Min-
isterial next year [i.e., fall 2003].” 
 
 
Economic Effects of Accession 
  Having reviewed some salient features of Russia’s policies that are pertinent to 
its accession to the WTO and assuming that the accession process is on track, the ques-
tion then is what will be the economic effects of accession on Russia and its major trad-
ing partners.  The tool of choice in addressing this question is a computable general equi-
librium (CGE) model that would encompass the structure and inter-sectoral relationships 
of production and trade in a multi-country setting.  Such modeling work is currently un-
derway at the World Bank and is to be reported in Tarr (2002).  There is also an ongoing 
collaborative modeling project between the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC) and Moscow State University.  Pending the availability of results from the fore-
going models, it may be of interest to use China’s accession as a prototype to help iden-
tify the key economic factors to be considered in evaluating Russia’s accession. 
  Ianchovichina and Martin (2001) have carried out an analysis of China’s acces-
sion using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) CGE model and the details of the 
November 1999 bilateral accession agreement between China and the United States that 
was publicly available to them at the time of writing.  As they note (pp. 427 and 430): 
“WTO entry will require China to bring its rules into line with WTO 
norms in a wide range of areas.  Perhaps the most fundamental of these 
stipulations are those on nondiscrimination between suppliers in accor-
dance with the Most Favored Nation principle; and the abolition of most 
nontariff barriers.  However, WTO rules require much more, including 
implementation of Intellectual Property regimes consistent with the 
TRIPS agreement, and procedures in areas like customs valuation, safe-
guards, standards and phyto-sanitary restrictions that are consistent with 
WTO rules. 
The Protocol of Accession will also include important stipulations d e-
signed to increase the transparency of China’s trade regime and provide 
for judicial review of administrative decisions. 
…China has also made important commitments on services under GATS, 
including comprehensive commitments on distribution services and tour-  12 
ism; and wide-ranging commitments on telecommunications, insurance, 
banking, construction, professional and individual services.  The com-
mitments on distribution are particularly important for merchandise trade 
because of the transparency they create, and because they preclude the 
emergence of de facto barriers through controls on distribution at any 
level of government.  The coverage of these commitments exceeds the 
average for high-income countries in the Uruguay Round, and far ex-
ceeds that for most developing countries….” 
 
 
  In their study, Ianchovichina and Martin concentrate on the changes in China’s 
merchandise trade regime.  They note that import quotas, licenses, and designated trading 
are to be phased out.  State trading is to be maintained for a number of agricultural prod-
ucts, petroleum, and certain metals, subject to WTO disciplines in the protection to be 
permitted.  China agreed to reduce its weighted average tariff on manufactures from 24.3 
percent as of 1995 to 6.95 percent with accession.  Agricultural import tariffs were to re-
main unchanged at about 17 percent and were bound at comparatively low levels by East 
Asian standards.  China agreed not to use agricultural export subsidies and to limit its 
aggregate measure of domestic support to agriculture to 8.5 percent. 
  It thus appears that China made considerable reductions in its tariffs on manufac-
tures, decided against high levels of agricultural protection, and made some important 
commitments for services liberalization.  It is evident that there is a close parallel b e-
tween the details of the Chinese accession package and the policy changes and commit-
ments to be sought by Russia’s major trading partners in the accession process.   
  Turning to the analysis of economic effects, Ianchovichina and Martin focused 
on the reductions in tariffs associated with China’s accession.  For this purpose, they as-
sumed that China’s 1995 tariffs on manufactures would have continued to apply without 
accession, and the protection after accession was measured as the lesser of the applied 
and bound tariff rates on manufactures.  Agricultural protection rates were assumed to 
remain unchanged, and NTBs were set at zero.  Presumably because of lack of data, Ian-  13 
chovichina and Martin did not include in their analysis China’s adherence to the various 
WTO rules and measures of services liberalization. 
  They considered two scenarios for computational purposes:  (1) a baseline sce-
nario in which China is assumed not to enter the WTO; and (2) a scenario in which they 
did enter the WTO.  Both scenarios were carried out in the context of projections for 
overall output growth, factor input growth of unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital, 
and a residual of total factor-productivity growth in manufacturing for China and its ma-
jor trading partners over the period from the model’s benchmark year of 1995 to 2005.  
The principal conclusions were as follows (pp. 436-40): 
•  Without accession, China’s share of world output between 1995 and 2005 has a pro-
jected increase from 3.4 to 5.3 percent, its share of world exports from 3.7 to 4.8 per-
cent, and its share of world imports from 3.4 to 5.3 percent.  With accession, China’s 
share of world output is unchanged, but its share of world exports rises to 6.8 percent 
and its share of world imports to 6.6 percent. 
 
•  On the sectoral level, the production and export of apparel rise markedly due to 
elimination of the Multi-Fibre Agreement and China’s continued cost competitive-
ness.  The automobile sector and several high-tech sectors experience substantial ex-
port growth with accession. 
 
•  With accession, China’s imports of oilseeds, meat, and various food products are pro-
jected to increase significantly, reflecting a shift in comparative advantage away from 
agriculture. 
 
•  Wages of unskilled workers are projected to grow at twice the rate of growth in 
wages of skilled workers.  Wages are expected to grow overall for both unskilled and 
skilled workers. 
 
•  With accession, China’s income is projected to rise by $128.6 billion, which is 2.2 
percent of 2005 base income.  China is the biggest beneficiary of accession.  The in-
dustrialized countries and East Asia also gain.  Many developing countries, especially 
in South and South East Asia, competing with China in third markets lose from 
China’s accession. 
There are several qualifications to the foregoing results worth mentioning: 
•  The benefits of Chinese accession noted above may be significantly understated for a 
variety of reasons.  Thus, the benefits would be greater by taking into account: 
 
(1) more disaggregated tariff changes; (2) adherence to WTO rules with regard to 
customs administration, standards, and judicial review of administrative deci-
sions; (3) reduction of services barriers; and (4) dynamic growth effects resulting   14 
from technological improvements, increased real capital inflows in the form of 
direct investment, and increased accumulation of physical and human capital. 
 
•  There are possible downsides to the benefits of accession, including: 
(1) the adjustment costs resulting from job displacement due to increased import 
competition in China’s domestic market; and (2) the increase in administered 
protection by China’s major trading partners that may be engendered by greater 
imports of Chinese products. 
   
On balance, it would appear that significant benefits will be realized from 
China’s accession to the WTO.  Of course, the Russian and Chinese economies have 
many differences in their economic structure and patterns of specialization.  Russia has a 
much smaller population, a relatively much smaller rural/agricultural sector, and sizable 
endowments of minerals and fuels resources.  Yet, both China and Russia are  character-
ized by a legacy of government controls and regulations.  Nonetheless, it is clear that 
China has already accomplished a great deal by its unilateral liberalization and alignment 
with foreign markets in the past two decades.  China’s accession to the WTO will thus 
reinforce the benefits that have already been set in motion by previous policy changes. 
  Russia can therefore learn from the Chinese experience.  Careful analytical stud-
ies are needed accordingly to document the status quo of the Russian economy and to 
provide quantitative evidence on the economic effects that accession to the WTO may 
have.  As already mentioned, a good starting point is the development of a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) framework of analysis coupled with efforts to compile the 
basic economic data needed to conduct simulation analysis of alternative policy options 
for Russian liberalization, including accession to the WTO.  In addition to the ongoing 
modeling to be reported in Tarr (2002) and the collaborative project between the USITC 
and Moscow State University, another possibility would be to use the Michigan CGE 
Model to analyze Russian accession, as described in more detail below.     15 
IV. Post-WTO Accession:  The Doha Development Round 
  Assuming that Russian accession to the WTO will be consummated in 2003, this 
will occur in the context of the ongoing multilateral negotiations underway in the Doha 
Development Round that commenced in January 2002.  With accession, Russia would 
become a party to the multilateral negotiations, and it is conceivable that Russia could be 
called upon to undertake liberalization beyond what was agreed upon in the accession 
process.  In any case, since Russia presently has de facto most-favored-nation (MFN) 
status, it would benefit from the Doha Round liberalization effected by its major trading 
partners even without accession.  Accession would bring de jure MFN status and concur-
rently the obligation for Russia to abide by WTO rules and change its domestic policies 
and institutions accordingly. Russia would also, as Lamy (2001) notes, have more pre-
dictable access to WTO member-country markets and the use of binding dispute settle-
ment to protect its export interests. The resulting deepening of integration into the global 
trading system would ideally enhance Russia’s ability to adapt to changing market condi-
tions and solidify the benefits to be obtained.  It is also possible that Russia could join in 
the Doha Round with other transition economies, including China, to induce the industri-
alized countries to reduce and remove their trade barriers and alter other policies condu-
cive to expanding market access for imports. 
  There is a lot at stake in the Doha Round.  The potential benefits of liberalization 
for WTO members may be substantial, as is evidenced in table 5.  This table summarizes 
the simulation results of 33 percent reductions in post-Uruguay Round (2005) tariffs and 
other trade barriers on agricultural products (DR-1), manufactures (DR-2), and services 
(DR-3), using the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade.  It can be seen that 
the 33 percent reduction in all barriers (DR-4) noted in column (4) increases global wel-
fare by $613.0 billion.  If all barriers were to be completely removed (DR-5), global wel-  16 
fare would rise to $1.7 trillion.  It is further evident that the welfare gains are positive and 
relatively substantial across all of the countries/regions indicated in table 5. 
The foregoing results are based on the GTAP database for 1995, updated for pro-
jections to the year 2005.  Russia is not included separately in this 1995 GTAP database 
or in the more recent 1997 version.  Rather, it is included as part of an aggregate of coun-
tries comprising the Former Soviet Union (FSU).  The modeling structure and results in 
table 5 treat the FSU as part of the rest-of-world, which is taken as a residual to close the 
model.  It is therefore not possible at this time to assess the potential effects on Russia of 
Doha Round liberalization.  This can be done once explicit data for Russia are integrated 
into the GTAP database. 
In considering how Russia may be affected by multilateral liberalization, it may 
be useful to describe some of the key features of the Michigan Model.  The Michigan 
Model is a multi-country, multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of 
the global trading system that has been used for nearly three decades to analyze the eco-
nomic effects of trade liberalization and other trade-related changes in policies.  The for-
mal structure and equations of the Michigan Model are available online at 
www.Fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/model/, and the economic features of the model are dis-
cussed in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002a,b) and in a number of their other papers. 
  The Michigan Model is distinctive insofar as it incorporates several aspects of the 
New Trade Theory, including monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, and 
product heterogeneity.  Even though the model includes these features, it remains the 
case that markets respond to trade liberalization in much the same way that they would 
with perfect competition.  That is, when tariffs or other trade barriers are reduced in a 
sector, domestic buyers (both final and intermediate) substitute toward imports, and the 
domestic competing industry contracts production while foreign exporters expand.  With 
multilateral liberalization reducing tariffs and other trade barriers simultaneously in most   17 
sectors and countries, each country’s industries share in both of these effects, expanding 
or contracting depending primarily on whether their protection is reduced more or less 
than in other sectors and countries.  At the same time, countries with larger average tariff 
reductions than their trading partners tend to experience a real depreciation of their cur-
rencies in o rder to maintain a constant trade balance, so that all countries therefore ex-
perience mixtures of both expanding and contracting sectors. 
  Worldwide, these changes cause increased international demand for all sectors, 
with world prices rising most for those sectors where trade barriers fall the most.  This in 
turn causes changes in countries’ terms of trade that can be positive or negative.  Those 
countries that are net exporters of goods with the greatest degree of liberalization will 
experience increases in their terms of trade, as the world prices of their exports rise rela-
tive to their imports.  The reverse occurs for net exporters in industries where liberaliza-
tion is slight – perhaps because it already happened in previous negotiations. 
  The effects on the welfare of countries arise from a mixture of these terms-of-
trade effects, together with the standard efficiency gains from trade and also from addi-
tional benefits due to elements of the New Trade Theory.  Thus, it is expected on average 
that the world will gain from multilateral liberalization, as resources are reallocated to 
those sectors in each country where there is a comparative advantage. In the absence of 
terms-of-trade effects, these efficiency gains should normally raise national welfare 
measured by the equivalent variation for every country, although some factor owners 
within a country may lose, as will be noted below.  However, it is possible for a particular 
country whose net imports are concentrated in sectors with the greatest liberalization to 
lose overall, if the worsening of its terms of trade swamps these efficiency gains. 
On the other hand, although the New Trade Theory is perhaps best known for in-
troducing new reasons why countries may lose from trade, in fact its greatest contribution 
is to expand the list of reasons for gains from trade.  It is these that are the dominant con-  18 
tribution of the New Trade Theory in the Michigan Model.  That is, trade liberalization 
permits all countries to expand their export sectors at the same time that all sectors com-
pete more closely with a larger number of competing varieties from abroad.  As a result, 
countries as a whole gain from lower costs due to increasing returns to scale, lower mo-
nopoly distortions due to greater competition, and reduced costs and/or increased utility 
due to greater product variety.  All of these effects make it more likely that countries will 
gain from liberalization in ways that are shared across the entire population. 
  In perfectly competitive trade models such as the Heckscher-Ohlin Model, one 
expects countries as a whole to gain from trade, but the owners of one factor – the “scarce 
factor” – to lose through the mechanism first explored by Stolper and Samuelson (1941).  
The additional sources of gain from trade due to increasing returns to scale, competition, 
and product variety, however, are shared across factors, and it is routinely found in appli-
cations of the Michigan Model that both labor and capital gain from liberalization.   
  In the real world, all of the foregoing effects occur over time, some of them more 
quickly than others.  The Michigan Model is however static, based upon a single set of 
equilibrium conditions rather than relationships that vary over time.  The computational 
results reported in table 5 therefore refer to a time horizon that is somewhat uncertain, 
depending on the assumptions that have been made about which variables do and do not 
adjust to changing market conditions, and on the short- or long-run nature of these ad-
justments.  Because the elasticities of supply and demand used in the model reflect rela-
tively long-run adjustments and because it is assumed for the scenarios reported in table 5 
that markets for both labor and capital clear within countries, the modeling results are 
appropriate for a relatively long time horizon of several years—perhaps two or three at a 
minimum. 
On the other hand, The Michigan Model does not allow for the very long-run ad-
justments that could occur through capital accumulation, population growth, and techno-  19 
logical change.  The modeling results should therefore be thought of as being superim-
posed upon longer-run growth paths of the economies involved.  To the extent that these 
growth paths themselves may be influenced by trade liberalization, therefore, the Michi-
gan Model does not capture that.  
  In principle, analysis of the economic effects of Russia’s accession to the WTO 
and its participation in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiation lends itself read-
ily to CGE modeling, provided that the requisite data for Russia can be mobilized.  The 
advantages of such modeling are a focus on the economy-wide and global- interaction 
effects of trade liberalization, including the aggregate impact on economic welfare and 
the disaggregated, sectoral impacts on trade, production, and the allocation of labor and 
capital.  It is therefore possible to measure the benefits of trade liberalization overall and 
to identify the sectors that may be affected positively or adversely by liberalization.  Such 
information can therefore help to guide and influence the negotiating strategies of policy 
makers in Russia as well as in Russia’s major trading partners.  By the same token, it 
should be recognized that there are many aspects of Russian accession and participation 
in the Doha Round that are difficult to model, especially adherence to and implementa-
tion of the various WTO rules and processes. 
V.  Negotiation of Preferential Trading Arrangements 
  The discussion has focused thus far on Russia’s WTO accession and potential 
involvement in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  It is also important to 
note that Russia has preferential trading arrangements with the former Soviet republics 
that comprise the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  These arrangements in-
clude bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, which may possibly be   20 
extended to form a customs union with a common external tariff.  Russia also has bilat-
eral customs union agreements with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic.   
Russia has had a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the EU since De-
cember 1997, and discussions are to be initiated in connection with formation of a Com-
mon European Economic Space that would include Russia.  There has also been some 
discussion of an eventual FTA between Russia and the EU.  Finally, it may be noted that 
Russia may possibly be affected adversely by EU enlargement to incorporate Poland and 
the Baltic States (i.e., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). 
  Michalopoulos and Tarr (1997) are critical of the existing CIS preferential ar-
rangements and possible future changes in these arrangements, especially from the stand-
points of the individual CIS members apart from Russia.  In their view, there is a danger 
that the CIS members might well lock themselves into the old technology of the former 
Soviet Union.  Furthermore, for several CIS countries that have already adopted or will 
choose to adopt relatively liberal trade regimes with low tariffs, becoming a member of a 
customs union with relatively high tariffs would be detrimental to their economic wel-
fare.  Moreover, keeping their tariffs low is an important consideration as these countries 
seek accession to the WTO. 
  The EU-Russian Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) is primarily a 
trade agreement that guarantees Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment to both partners.  
The PCA also includes commitments on preferential access in some services sectors and 
the harmonization of pertinent Russian legislation with that of the EU.  Further, the for-
mation of a Common European Economic Space would more fully integrate Russia with 
the rest of Europe. 
  Brenton, Tourdyeva, and Whalley (1997) have analyzed the potential trade ef-
fects of a Russia-EU FTA.  They conclude that such an FTA would be trade diverting for 
a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Japan and the United   21 
States.  In any event, as noted in Carl (2002), the EU strongly supports the completion of 
Russian  accession to the WTO before any further, broader European or bilateral a r-
rangements are to be pursued.  But in the interim, as noted, there may be some concern 
that EU enlargement could be detrimental to Russia’s trading interests.     
While Russian involvement in further preferential trading arrangements is for 
now secondary to its WTO accession, it may be of interest in this context to ask how the 
economic benefits from preferential trading arrangements compare with the benefits from 
multilateral liberalization.  In this connection, Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002a,b) 
have used the Michigan Model to analyze a variety of FTAs that the United States, Japan, 
Canada, and Mexico have negotiated or are actively considering.  Table 6 contains the 
global welfare effects for four regional arrangements.  An FTA comprising the members 
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum would increase global welfare 
by $764.4 billion, an FTA involving members of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) plus China (including Hong Kong), Japan, and South Korea increases 
global welfare by $224.7 billion, an expansion of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) to include Chile would increase global welfare by $5.5 billion, and 
a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Agreement (WHFTA) would increase global welfare 
by $77.9 billion.  When these different arrangements are compared to the global welfare 
effects of multilateral liberalization noted in table 5, it is evident that the multilateral wel-
fare effects are considerably larger in both absolute and percentage terms.  This is even 
more the case for comparison of the global welfare effects of the bilateral FTAs for Japan 
and the United States indicated in table 7.  This conclusion applies as well to the FTAs 
involving Canada and Mexico that are analyzed in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2000a).   
  The foregoing discussion suggests that Russia would potentially have much more 
to gain from accession to the WTO coupled with participation in the Doha Round of mul-
tilateral negotiations than it would gain from preferential arrangements with CIS mem-  22 
bers or with the EU.  Once the requisite data for Russia are available to permit CGE 
modeling, this conclusion can be checked against the data. 
VI.  Conclusions  
  The foregoing review of the issues involved in analyzing the economic effects of 
Russia’s accession to the WTO suggests the following conclusions: 
•  Russia has made remarkable progress in achieving macroeconomic stability 
and structural reform, which will help to ease the process of adjustment to 
WTO accession. 
 
•  The commodity structure of Russia’s merchandise exports is concentrated 
especially in minerals and fuels and, to a lesser extent, in some categories of 
industrial products.  Russia’s imports are concentrated in some categories of 
industrial products and in agricultural products. 
 
•  Russia’s exports and imports are concentrated geographically with the 
EU/EFTA and with the former Soviet Republics and members of the Soviet 
Bloc.  Russia’s export specialization in minerals and fuels may be of key 
economic and strategic especially in its intra-European trade. 
 
•  Russia’s tariffs are on average relatively low, although there are peaks in se-
lected products.  Official tariff rates are substantially in excess of applied 
rates.  Weaknesses in customs procedures may constitute a significant barrier 
to imports 
 
•  There are several aspects of Russia’s trade and related policies that are at is-
sue in the WTO accession process covering: agriculture; intellectual prop-
erty; services; standards and certification; investment; government procure-
ment; state trading; and the U.S. granting of permanent normal trading 
relations (PNTR). 
 
•  Russia’s application for GATT/WTO accession has been in process since 
1993, and it is now apparently in its final phases.  Pending the outcome of 
ongoing bilateral negotiations, Russian accession may be completed by the 
time of the next WTO Ministerial Meeting to be held in Mexico in the fall of 
2003. 
 
•  Russia may realize significant economic benefits from WTO accession as the 
result of the reduction of its import tariffs and liberalization of domestic poli-
cies.  There is considerable scope for the use of computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) models to assess these economic benefits.  There may be addi-
tional benefits, which are difficult to quantify, arising from more predictable 
access of Russian exports to foreign markets and Russia’s adherence to WTO 
rules and agreements, especially the use of binding dispute settlement to pro-
tect its trading interests.   23 
 
•  Russia may further realize significant economic benefits from participation in 
the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  These benefits 
could be considerably greater than those that would result from preferential 
trading arrangements with CIS members and with the European Union.   24 
Appendix 1 
The Procedure for WTO Accession 
•  Commencement of the accessions process—The process of accession to the WTO 
commences when an applicant submits a communication to   the Director-General of 
the WTO expressing its desire to accede to the WTO under Article XII.   The General 
Council then considers the application and establishes a working party. The standard   
terms of reference of working parties are "to examine the application for accession to 
the WTO   under Article XXXIII and to submit to the General Council/Ministerial 
Conference recommendations   which may include a draft Protocol of Accession". 
Any member of the WTO can join the working   party. The working party is chaired 
by a Chairperson selected after consultations with WTO   Members and the applicant. 
•  Working party and the fact-finding process—Once the working party is established, 
the applicant provides a Memorandum describing in detail its foreign trade régime, 
together with information on the currently applicable tariff schedule and copies of 
relevant laws and regulations in one of the WTO official languages (English, French 
and Spanish).  Following the circulation of the Memorandum, members of the work-
ing party ask questions in relation to it to obtain more information about the appli-
cant's foreign trade régime. After the replies to the questions are received, the first 
meeting of the working party is scheduled. At the initial meeting of the working 
party, members of the working party examine the Memorandum and  the questions 
and answers to study the conformity of the regime with the various requirements of 
the WTO Agreements. At the end of the first and any subsequent meeting of the 
working party, the Chairperson outlines the next steps required for future meetings. 
Thereafter, additional questions in writing, replies and further information papers are 
exchanged. Especially in the case of least developed and small economy applicants, 
technical assistance at each stage of the accession process can be obtained from the 
Secretariat. 
•  Bilateral negotiations—When the examination of the foreign trade régime is suffi-
ciently advanced, members of the working party and the applicant commence bilat-
eral market access negotiations on goods and services, as well as on the other specific 
terms of accession. The negotiating phase and the fact-finding work on the foreign 
trade régime usually overlap and proceed in parallel. The phase commences either by 
the applying government tabling its initial offer on goods or services or interested 
WTO Members submitting their request lists to the applicant. The negotiations on 
market access constitute the most critical element of the accessions process as Mem-
bers want to ensure that acceding governments grant concessions which are compa-
rable to the concessions that they will be benefiting from in the markets of Members. 
The resulting market-access commitments of acceding governments can be consid-
ered to be the payment for the entry ticket into the WTO. 
•  Report, Protocol of Accession and Entry into Force—The summary of the discus-
sions in the working party is contained in the Report of the working party together 
with a draft Decision and Protocol of Accession. The Protocol of Accession contains 
the terms of accession agreed by the Applicant and members of the working party.  
Following the conclusion of bilateral negotiations between interested Members and 
the Applicant, the Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and the 
Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services are prepared. These Schedules are   25 
annexed to and are part of the draft Protocol of Accession.  When the Draft Report, 
Draft Protocol and Schedules on Goods and Services have been finalised, the work-
ing party submits the package to the WTO General Council/Ministerial Conference 
for approval. Following the decision of the General Council/Ministerial Conference 
to adopt the package, the Protocol of Accession enters into force. Thirty days after 
acceptance by the applicant, it becomes a WTO Member. 
Source:  Adapted from [www.wto.org].   26 
References  
Bergsman, Joel, Harry G. Broadman, and Vladimir Drebentsov.  1999.  “Improving Rus-
sia’s Foreign Direct Investment Policy Regime,” in Harry G. Broadman (ed.). 
 
Brenton, Paul, Natalia Tourdyeva, and John Whalley.  1997.  “The Potential Trade Ef-
fects of an FTA between the EU and Russia,”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 
133:205-25. 
 
Broadman, Harry G. (ed.).  1999.  “Russian Trade Policy:  Reform for WTO Accession,” 
World Bank Discussion, Paper No. 401.  Washington, D.C.:  The World Bank. 
 
Brown, Drusilla, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern.  2002a.  “Impacts on NAFTA 
Members of Multilateral and Regional Trading Arrangements and Initiatives and 
Harmonization of NAFTA’s External Tariffs,” in Richard Harris (ed.), Opportu-
nities and Challenges for Canada, Calgary University Press, forthcoming. 
 
Brown, Drusilla K., Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern.  2002b.  “Multilateral, Re-
gional, and Bilateral Trade-Policy Options for the United States and Japan,” in 
Robert M. Stern (ed.), Issues and Options for U.S.-Japan Trade Policies.  Ann 
Arbor:  University of Michigan Press. 
 
Carl, Mogens Peter.  2002.  “How to break down trade barriers between the EU and Rus-
sia,” speech delivered at the Baltic Development Forum Conference, Copenha-
gen, January 23.  [www.europa.eu.intcommtradespeeches_articlessp_mpc05. 
htm] 
 
Drebentsov, Vladimir and Costas Michalopoulos.  1999.  “State Trading in Russia,” in 
Harry G. Broadman (ed.). 
 
European Union.  2002.  “Bilateral Trade Relations:  Russia” (May).  [www.europa.eu.int 
comm.trade/bilateral/russia/russia.htm] 
 
Gorban, M., S. Guriev, and K. Yudaeva.  2001.  “Russia in the WTO:  Myths and Real-
ity,” Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) and Club 2015, Mos-
cow (July).  [www.cefir.ru; and www.club.2015.ru] 
 
Ianchovichina, Elena and Will Martin.  2001.  “Trade Liberalization in China’s Acces-
sion to the WTO,” Journal of Economic Integration 16:421-45. 
 
Lamy, Pascal.  2001.  “WTO accession:  What’s in it for Russia?”  Speech at Roundtable:  
“Russia, the International Economy and the WTO,” Moscow (March 30).  
[www.europa.eu.int comm. trade speeches_articles/spla54_en.htm] 
 
Michalopoulos, Costas and David Tarr.  1997.  “The Economics of Customs Unions in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States,” Policy Research Working Paper 
1786, June.  Washington, D.C.:  World Bank. 
 
Moore, Mike.  2002.  “Russia and the WTO:  Reintegration into the World Economy,” 
Fifth A nnual Russian Economic Forum, WTO News:  Speeches – D.G. Mike   27 
Moore, London, April 19.  [www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm84_e. 
htm]. 
 
OECD.  2002.  OECD Economic Surveys 2001-2002:  Russian Federation.  Paris:  
OECD. 
 
Smith, Murray G.  1999.  “Russia and the ‘General Agreement on Trade in Services’ 
(GATS),” in Harry G. Broadman (ed.). 
 
Stamps, James.  2001.  “Russia’s WTO Accession:  Many Hurdles Remain,” Interna-
tional Economic Review, July/August, pp. 7-15. 
 
Tarr, David.  1999.  “Design of Tariff Policy for Russia,” in Harry G. Broadman (ed.). 
 
Tarr, David.  2002.  “Russia’a Accession to the WTO:  Economy-Wide and Sector Im-
pacts,” to be presented at conference on “Negotiating Russia’s Accession:  Stra-
tegic Lessons from Multilateral Trade Liberalization and Club Enlargement,” 
Moscow, June 24-25.   
 
Tavernise, Sabrina.  2002.  “U.S. Decides to Recognize Russia as Market Economy,” The 
New York Times, June 7, p. W1. 
 
U.S. Congress.  2002.  “Hearing to Explore Permanent Normal Trade Relations for Rus-
sia,” April 11, 2002.  [www.house.gov/ways_means/trade/107cong/4-11-01/4-
11levi.htm]. 
 
USTR.  2000b.  National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers 2002.  
[www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2002/index.htm]. 
 
USTR.  2002a.  2002 Trade Policy Agenda and 2001 Annual Report of the President of 
the United States on the Trade Agreements Program [www.ustr.gov/reports/ 
2002.html]. 
 
World Trade Organization.  2002.  “ACC:  The procedure.”  [www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/wto08_53.htm]. 
 
Zoellick, Robert B.  2002.  “Statement of Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative 
before the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Feb. 7.  [www.usr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/index. shtml#test]. 
 
 




The Commodity and Geographic Composition of Russian Exports, 2000
a 
(Mill. US$ and Percent) 
 
  Agricultural Products  Minerals & Fuels  Industrial Products  Total Exports 
  Value  Percent  Value  Percent  Value  Percent  Value  Percent 
Developed Countries  394.5  28.0  16,978.4  46.5  14,214.4  42.5  31,587.3  44.2 
Australia/New Zealand  2.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  5.0  0.0  7.2  0.0 
Canada  2.1  0.1  7.3  0.0  67.6  0.2  76.9  0.1 
EU/EFTA  235.0  16.7  16,460.9  45.1  9,713.5  29.0  26,409.4  37.0 
Japan  133.5  9.5  323.9  0.9  1,793.6  5.4  2,250.9  3.2 
United States  21.7  1.5  186.4  0.5  2,634.8  7.9  2,842.9  4.0 
Former Soviet Bloc  497.3  35.3  9,655.9  26.5  6,865.6  20.5  17,018.7  23.9 
Baltic States  63.4  4.5  2,104.1  5.8  2,400.0  7.2  4,567.4  6.4 
Central & E. Europe  22.7  1.6  5,775.4  15.8  1,100.9  3.3  6,899.0  9.7 
CIS  411.2  29.2  1,776.4  4.9  3,364.7  10.0  5,552.3  7.8 
Caribbean & L. America  4.7  0.3  4,539.6  12.4  1,072.9  3.2  5,617.3  7.9 
Asia, excl. Japan  317.2  22.5  1,174.5  3.2  5,855.0  17.5  7,346.7  10.3 
Other Developing Countries  196.7  13.9  4,183.8  11.5  5,475.2  16.4  9,855.8  13.8 
Total  1,410.4  100.0  36,532.2  100.0  33,483.1  100.0  71,425.7  100.0 
Percent    2.0%    51.1%    46.9%    100.0% 
aAccording to the IMF, International Financial Statistics (April 2002), Russia’s exports were $105,505 million in 2000.  
This includes an adjustment for barter and “shuttle” trade.  Agricultural products include HS 1-24, minerals & fuels, HS 25-
27, and industrial products, HS 28-96. 
Source:  Calculations provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research.   29 
 
Table 2 
The Commodity and Geographic Composition of Russian Imports, 2000
a 
(Mill. US$ and Percent) 
  Agricultural Products  Minerals & Fuels  Industrial Products  Total Imports 
  Value  Percent  Value  Percent  Value  Percent  Value  Percent 
Developed Countries  2,950.8  40.0  1,19.3  7.5  10,,808.2  55.3  13,878.3  48.7 
Australia/New Zealand  32.7  0.4  2.6  0.2  157.2  0.8  192.5  0.7 
Canada  32.4  0.4  0.7  0.0  156.1  0.8  189.2  0.7 
EU/EFTA  2,149.4  29.1  99.1  6.3  8,526.5  43.6  10,774.9  37.8 
Japan  1.8  0.0  8.1  0.5  548.4  2.8  558.3  2.0 
United States  734.6  10.0  8.7  0.6  1,420.0  7.3  2,163.4  7.6 
Former Soviet Bloc  2,014.2  27.3  1,260.1  79.7  5,673.0  29.0  8,947.4  31.4 
Baltic States  80.4  1.1  17.4  1.1  220.2  1.1  318.0  1.1 
Central & E. Europe  286.2  3.9  6.3  0.4  1,232.8  6.3  1,525.4  5.4 
CIS  1,647.6  22.3  1,236.4  78.2  4,220.0  21.6  7,104.0  24.9 
Caribbean & L. America  734.7  10.0  17.7  1.1  356.4  1.8  1,108.8  3.9 
Asia, excl. Japan  1,221.5  16.5  118.1  7.5  1,506.0  7.7  2,845.7  10.0 
Other Developing Countries  460.7  6.2  66.0  4.2  1,194.7  6.1  1,721.4  6.0 
Total  7,381.9  100.0  1,581.3  100.0  19,538.3  100.0  28,501.6  100.0 
Percent    25.9%    5.5%    68.5%    100.0% 
aAccording to the IMF,  International Financial Statistics (April 2002), Russia’s imports (fob) were $44,659 million in 
2000.  This includes an adjustment for barter and “shuttle” trade.  Agricultural products include HS 1-24, minerals & fuels, 
HS 25-27, and industrial products, HS 28-96. 
Source:  Calculations provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research. 
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Table 3 
Tariff Rates of the Russian Federation, 1996
a 
 
Sectors  Unweighted 
Food manufacturing  14.7 
Beverages  23.1 
Tobacco  17.5 
Textiles  16.4 
Wearing apparel  24.1 
Leather products  9.7 
Footwear  20.0 
Wood, cork, and products  17.5 
Wooden furniture & fixtures  24.7 
Paper products  14.2 
Printing & publishing  12.5 
Industrial chemicals  5.7 
Other chemical products  7.4 
Petroleum refineries  5.0 
Petroleum & coal products  9.0 
Rubber products  6.0 
Plastic products nec.  13.8 
Ceramic products  22.9 
Glass & glass products  14.5 
Other nonmetal min prods  15.8 
Iron & steel B-met ind  5.6 
Nonferrous B-met ind  13.1 
Metal products nee  18.8 
Nonelectric machinery  12.4 
Electrical machinery  10.1 
Transport equipment  16.6 
Scientific equipment  15.7 
Other manufacturing  20.5 
aWorld Bank Estimates for 1996. 






Average Official and Applied Tariff Rates 
On Russian Imports, 1996-99 
(Percent) 
  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Nominal official weighted average tariff rates  14  14  12  8 
Applied tariff rates (actual duty collected/value of imports)  4  7  7  5 
 
Source:  Adapted from Gorban, Guriev, and Yudaeva (2001, p. 6).   31 
Table 5 
Global Welfare Effects of Multilateral Negotiating Options in the Doha Round 
(Percent of GNP and Billions of Dollars) 
















Global Free Trade 
All Barriers Removed—DR-5 
(5) 
Industrialized Countries                     
    Japan  0.07%  $4.3  0.89%  $57.8  0.95%  $61.6  1.90%  $123.7  5.77%  $374.8 
    United States  -0.04  -4.1  0.34  31.3  1.65  150.0  1.95  177.3  5.92  537.2 
    Canada  0.01  0.1  0.38  2.8  1.46  10.6  1.85  13.5  5.62  40.9 
    Australia  -0.04  -0.2  0.56  2.5  0.65  2.8  1.16  5.1  3.52  15.5 
    New Zealand  -0.04  -0.0  1.88  1.4  1.20  0.8  3.04  2.2  9.22  6.8 
    EU and EFTA  0.02  2.2  0.58  63.3  0.94  103.4  1.54  168.9  4.67  511.9 
Developing Countries                               
  Asia                               
    Hong Kong  0.02  0.0  1.56  2.0  1.78  2.3  3.36  4.3  10.18  13.1 
    China  0.18  1.6  0.54  4.9  0.79  7.1  1.50  13.6  4.55  41.2 
    Korea  0.16  0.9  1.40  8.0  0.91  5.2  2.48  14.1  7.51  42.7 
    Singapore  0.12  0.1  2.85  2.1  2.62  1.9  5.60  4.2  16.96  12.6 
    Taiwan  0.71  2.5  1.58  5.6  0.49  1.7  2.78  9.8  8.44  29.6 
    Indonesia  0.06  0.1  0.06  0.1  0.79  2.0  1.65  4.2  5.00  12.7 
    Malaysia  0.28  0.3  1.99  2.4  0.54  0.6  2.81  3.4  8.51  10.2 
    Philippines  0.20  0.2  3.52  3.1  1.68  1.5  5.40  4.8  16.38  14.5 
    Thailand  0.03  0.1  1.47  3.0  1.12  2.3  2.62  5.4  7.94  16.4 
    Rest of Asia  0.40  2.3  0.90  5.2  0.47  2.7  1.78  10.2  5.38  30.8 
  Other                                
    Chile  -0.05  -0.0  1.29  1.0  1.17  0.9  2.40  1.9  7.28  5.9 
    Mexico  0.03  0.1  0.32  1.1  1.49  5.2  1.84  6.5  5.58  19.6 
    Cent., Carib., S. Amer.  -0.03  -0.5  0.31  5,.1  1.13  18.9  1.41  23.6  4.28  71.4 
    Middle East & N. Africa  0.09  0.8  0.92  8.0  0.88  7.6  1.90  16.4  5.75  49.7 
                                
Total     10.8     210.7     389.6     613.0     1,857.4 
Source:  Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002a).   32 
Table 6 
Global Welfare Effects of Regional Negotiating Options  
(Percent of GNP and Billions of Dollars) 
 
  APEC FTA 
(1) 






Industrialized Countries                       
    Japan  4.36%  $283.1  2.48%  $160.8  0.002%  $0.1  0.006%  $0.4 
    United States  3.25  294.7  0.02  2.3  0.046  4.2  0.581  52.7 
    Canada  4.21  30.7  0.04  0.3  0.040  0.3  0.383  2.8 
    Australia  2.99  13.0  0.20  0.9  -0.003  -0.0  -0.009  -0.0 
    New Zealand  6.09  4.5  0.23  0.2  -0.001  -0.0  -0.004  -0.0 
    EU and EFTA  -0.06  -7.0  -0.02  -2.6  -0.001  -0.1  -0.008  -0.9 
Developing Countries                         
  Asia                         
    Hong Kong  8.10  10.4  4.15  5.3  0.003  0.0  -0.034  -0.0 
    China  2.17  19.6  0.36  3.2  -0.002  -0.0  -0.008  -0.1 
    Korea  5.10  29.0  3.03  17.2  -0.004  -0.0  -0.028  -0.2 
    Singapore  11.85  8.8  8.46  6.3  0.004  0.0  0.036  0.0 
    Taiwan  6.32  22.2  1.97  6.9  0.003  0.0  0.015  0.1 
    Indonesia  3.52  8.9  2.15  5.4  -0.001  -0.0  -0.002  -0.0 
    Malaysia  5.32  6.4  3.34  4.0  0.005  0.0  0.069  0.1 
    Philippines  11.52  10.2  6.16  5.4  0.005  0.0  0.013  0.0 
    Thailand  5.18  10.7  2.78  5.7  0.002  0.0  -0.003  -0.0 
    Rest of Asia  -0.18  -1.0  -0.01  -0.1  0.001  0.0  -0.001  -0.0 
  Other                          
    Chile  3.91  3.1  0.38  0.3  0.922  0.7  2.478  2.0 
    Mexico  3.94  13.9  -0.02  -0.1  0.116  0.4  0.806  2.8 
    Cent., Carib., S. Amer.  -0.01  -.1  0.05  0.8  -0.010  -0.2  1.103  18.4 
    Middle East & N. Africa  0.39  3.4  0.27  2.3  -0.003  -0.0  -0.017  -0.1 
                          
Total     764.4     224.7     5.5     77.9 
Source:  Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002a). 
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Table 7 
Global Welfare Effects of Bilateral Negotiating Options for Japan and the United States 
(Percent of GNP and Millions of Dollars) 




















Industrialized Countries                                         
    Japan  0.17%  $10,857  0.02%  $1180  0.42%  $27,365  0.004%  $268  0.07%  $4,341  0.002%  $130  0.10%  $6,343 
    United States  0.02  1,561  0.18  16,724  -0.00  -207  0.32  29226  -0.00  -46  0.046  4,215  -0.01  -750 
    Canada  0.02  114  -0.01  -90  0.00  36  0.04  252  -0.00  -4  0.005  34  -0.01  -33 
    Australia  0.03  125  0.03  140  0.01  51  0.00  10  0.00  2  -0.002  -10  0.0  9 
    New Zealand  0.02  18  0.03  19  0.01  7  0.00  2  -0.00  -0  -0.001  -1  0.0  2 
    EU and EFTA  0.01  1,249  0.01  956  -0.00  -214  0.00  196  0.00  -52  0.000  -42  -0.0  -121 
                                            
Developing Countries                                           
  Asia                                           
    Hong Kong  0.01  9  -0.02  -27  0.01  11  0.06  78  0.00  -0  0.003  3  -0.0  -4 
    China  -0.01  -73  -0.01  -57  -0.00  -30  0.00  42  0.00  -4  -0.001  -11  0.0  0 
    Korea  0.01  53  0.02  96  0.57  3,232  1.44  8,172  -0.00  -18  -0.003  -17  -0.0  -13 
    Singapore  2.43  1,808  2.70  2,009  -0.04  -31  0.02  16  -0.00  -1  0.004  3  -0.0  -3 
    Taiwan  0.02  64  -0.00  -109  -0.03  -117  0.00  0  -0.00  -8  0.002  7  -0.0  -26 
    Indonesia  -0.02  -42  0.01  17  0.01  34  0.01  34  0.00  -1  -0.001  -3  0.0  5 
    Malaysia  -0.34  -401  -0.20  -244  -0.03  -38  0.01  16  -0.00  -2  0.004  5  -0.0  -10 
    Philippines  -0.03  -22  -0.04  -31  -0.00  -0  0.01  12  -0.00  -1  0.004  4  -0.0  -.9 
    Thailand  -0.01  -28  0.00  6  -0.00  -3  0.00  11  -0.00  -4  0.002  4  0.0  10 
    Rest of Asia  0.00  30  -0.01  -28  0.00  17  0.01  82  0.00  -2  0.001  4  -0.0  -3 
                                            
  Other                                            
    Chile  -0.00  -2  0.01  118  0.02  12  0.01  6  0.86  688  0.596  478  -0.0  -0.9 
    Mexico  0.02  52  -0.02  -53  0.00  18  0.02  61  -0.00  -8  -0.001  -5  0.5  1,912 
    Cent., Carib., S.Amer.  0.00  53  -0.00  -32  0.00  45  0.01  135  0.00  16  -0.008  -128  -0.0  -21 
    Middle East & N. Af-
rica  -0.00  -7  0.00  24  0.01  105  0.02  200  0.00  6  -0.002  -16  0.0  16 
                                            
Total     15,419     20,612     30,292     38,821     4,903     4,652     7,302 
Source:  Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002b).  34 
 